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Targeting Pre-Operative Booking Processes to Decrease Risks of “Never Events”
Abstract
Problem: Wrong patient, wrong procedure, wrong site, and wrong side surgeries are such
egregious errors that are known as “never events.” Root cause analyses can pinpoint a failure yet
do little to determine if corrective action has reduced the risk of recurrence.
Context: Monitoring surgical cases prospectively to identify weaknesses that could help
identify specific risk factors to avert and move toward zero defects. The setting for this
quality improvement project is a >300-bed Level III trauma hospital, where the risk of
wrong-site surgeries and lack of standardized processes in the surgical pre-operative booking
process was of concern to organizational leadership.
Interventions: The project used The Joint Commission Center for Transforming Healthcare Safe
Surgery Targeted Solutions Tool® (SS TST®) to identify, measure, and correct preoperative
booking defects. Additionally, a pre/post intervention questionnaire was used to measure surgical
schedulers’ process satisfaction.
Measures: The outcome measures were changes in the number and types of pre-booking
defects. Evaluation of surgical scheduler staff satisfaction began with existing workflow
practices and concluded with workflow change evaluation.
Results: This project facilitated change in standardizing the perioperative process to decrease
risk by 47%, a relative improvement of 53.4%, recognize scheduler concerns, and implement
mitigating strategies.
Conclusions: Using the SS TST®, the hospital and the participating physician offices recognized
the risk associated with booking surgical procedures via phone versus written submission.
Standardizing online surgical booking improved surgical scheduler satisfaction.
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Dissemination: The data was disseminated to the host facility, pilot test sites, and corporate
leadership.
Key Words: surgical scheduling, preoperative booking, wrong-site surgery, “never events,” error,
human factors, Safe Surgery Targeted Solutions Tool®
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Section II: Introduction
Background
Wrong-site surgeries (WSS) consistently rank in the top five of the Joint Commission’s
annual evaluation of the most frequent sentinel events (The Joint Commission, 2020). When one
of these surgical “never events” occurs, a hospital typically conducts a root cause analysis to
pinpoint the hazards. It puts in place a set of policies or programs to reduce the risk of
recurrence. Because these events are infrequent in any facility or hospital system and cannot be
measured by incidence rates, it is rarely known if efforts put in place retrospectively have
reduced the risk of the event happening again. Monitoring perioperative practices prospectively
for weaknesses that could result in wrong-site surgeries rather than only looking back on what
has occurred, can help identify risk factors so targeted risk mitigation practices can be
implemented. Surgical procedures performed on the wrong patient, wrong site, or the wrong
procedure (collectively known as wrong-site surgeries) can be catastrophic for patients,
healthcare professionals, and healthcare systems.
Problem Description
More than 20 years ago, the National Academy of Medicine (NAM), formerly known as
the Institute of Medicine (IOM) published the seminal report “To Err is Human” (Kohn et al.,
2000), bringing the magnitude of medical errors to the attention of the healthcare profession and
the public. Wrong-site surgeries, as “never events,” receive outsize attention when they occur,
yet the problem persists, with 40-50 WSS per week (~2400/year) in the United States (The Joint
Commission, 2021). The unrealized problem at the hospital where the quality improvement
project was implemented, was the lack of identification, measurement, and targeting of the risks
which began with surgical scheduling, the entry point for pre-operative booking. Procedures
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were booked via phone, fax, email, hand-delivered documents, or through a website, using
various forms, notations, and unapproved abbreviations. With no standardized booking process
and many points at which errors could be introduced, the hospital welcomed implementing a
quality improvement study to measure and mitigate the risk of pre-operative booking defects at
the beginning of the perioperative continuum.
No previous efforts at this institution to improve surgical scheduling had focused on preoperative booking defects, as it had not been viewed as either high-risk for error or cause for
patient dissatisfaction. The DNP project lead proposed to the Chief Nursing Officer, the Chief of
the Medical Staff, and the Director of Perioperative Services using the Safe Surgery Targeted
Solutions Tool® (Center for Transforming Healthcare, 2009). The tool defines, identifies,
measures, and targets prioritization for preoperative surgical booking defect risks and it matches
targeted solutions to improve, sustain, and spread the quality improvements. The first goal of this
quality improvement project was risk mitigation. The second goal of this quality improvement
project was improved job and process satisfaction for surgical schedulers, both in-hospital and
in-office.
The surgeons alone were granted access to the scheduling template. The office schedulers
then had to be “proxied” into this system by their surgeon, proving unwieldy and a source of
frustration for the office staff and physicians alike. The Corporate Patient/Customer Experience
Office has been working to implement a seamless, easy to access surgery booking capability.
This new IT system upgrade will allow access to office staff to schedule surgeries and upload
necessary orders and documents prior to patient arrival to Pre-Admit Clinic (PAC) and date of
surgery in one step. Currently, this process is not a widely known option and has been a large
source of frustration across the perioperative continuum.
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Setting
The setting for this evidence-based change of practice project was a >300-bed acute care
hospital with a Level III Trauma Center in Texas. Surgical schedulers in the hospital and the
physicians’ offices reported the pre-booking processes as difficult to deal with due to phone wait
times which were often upwards of 30 minutes; the online booking system at physician offices
was not user-friendly, and there were multiple entry points for surgical scheduling at the hospital.
Three in-house surgical schedulers handled bookings for up to 500 surgeons from over 60
physicians’ offices for 18 operating rooms, for an average of over 14,000 surgical procedures
annually. Most physician office schedulers used the phone to book surgical procedures or used
their own procedures and forms, which they faxed, emailed or hand delivered.
In the previous state, the Director of Perioperative Services and the Director of Patient
Care sent multiple emails and texts during a patient’s Pre-Admit Clinic appointment or the day
before a scheduled surgery to confirm the case. Even if booking errors or omissions were
discovered in time and could be corrected, surgical setups may have needed to be reconfigured,
surgical sets reprocessed or discarded, and surgeries postponed or canceled—all adding to
hospital operational costs, staff frustrations, patient and family dissatisfaction, and the possibility
of jeopardizing patient safety by delaying the surgery. If not discovered, the booking defects
themselves could be entry points for wrong-site surgery “never” events. A simultaneous study
was implemented via the healthcare system’s patient experience team to streamline the surgical
continuum experience by standardizing the pre-operative process up to and including the day of
surgery, due to pointed customer feedback where opportunities for improvement were noted.
This facility’s mission is to advance health by providing expanded access to care with an
unmatched focus on quality, safety, and exceptional service. The DNP project lead, the Director
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of Perioperative Services, and the Director of Patient Care identified two gaps. First, as the
healthcare system continued to prioritize safety, quality, and service, unidentified or unquantified
risks left the organization vulnerable to sentinel events and associated liability. The commitment
to provide a world-class experience and patient outcomes was undercut by less than stellar
patient feedback. This patient feedback drove the hospital to streamline the pre-operative
booking process concurrent with implementing the DNP project.
Specific Aim
The specific aim of the pre-operative booking defect quality improvement project was to
reduce surgical booking defects transmitted from physicians’ offices to the hospital by 20%
within eight weeks. The broader objective of the project was to introduce a practical, evidencebased way to manage the risk of WSS proactively by identifying and attempting to correct
preoperative booking defects.
Available Knowledge
PICO(T) Question
In the formula set forth by Melnyk et al. (2017), a PICOT question was created to reflect
the project aim, inform the literature search strategy, evaluate the evidence, and guide the design
and development of the project. The PICOT question for this project was: For surgical
schedulers in hospitals and physicians’ offices (P), how does identifying, quantifying, and
correcting surgical booking defects (I), compared to current surgical booking practices (C),
change the incidence of surgical booking defects and workflow/job satisfaction for surgical
schedulers (O) eight weeks from the implementation (T)?
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Search Methodology
A review of the literature was performed on the CINAHL, PubMed, EBSCO Host, and
RefWorks databases. The search terms used were surgical, scheduling, booking, errors,
checklist, high-reliability organizations, operating room, robust process improvement, universal
protocol, and human factors, with the Boolean operators AND and OR. The inclusion criteria
were peer-reviewed research and non-research articles published in English between 2000 and
2020, demonstrating evidence-based practices for inpatient or outpatient settings. The 20-year
timeframe was chosen due to the paucity of evidence-based studies relevant to the PICOT
question, and the choice to include seminal studies with outsize influence on the current body of
evidence. Position papers advancing the interests of commercial entities and expert opinionpieces lacking references to evidence-based practices were excluded. The initial search returned
615 articles. Inclusion and exclusion criteria were applied to limit studies to those that addressed
the perioperative continuum and perioperative checklists, which brought the number of studies
for further evaluation down to 464.
Further changing the inclusion and exclusion criteria to identify studies that addressed
checklists and methods to decrease perioperative patient harm returned 87 relevant studies. By
reviewing abstracts, the number of studies that were chosen for appraisal decreased to 45. Only
three studies specifically addressed the evaluation of pre-operative scheduling. Using the Johns
Hopkins Nursing Evidence-Based Practice Evidence Appraisal Tools (Dang & Dearholt, 2018),
16 studies were of sufficient quality to be included in this review The evidence level and quality
of the studies ranged from Level I A High to Level V C Low (Appendix A).
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Integrated Review of the Literature
Six themes emerged from the review: a) the pre-operative booking process, b)
perioperative checklists, c) strategies and tools for reducing the risk of error, d) human factors
science, e) Lean Six Sigma (LSS) and Robust Process Improvement® (RPI) in healthcare, and f)
high-reliability organization (HRO) tenets, all to help eliminate wrong-site surgery.
Pre-Operative Booking
Three studies (Brown et al., 2001; Clarke, et al., 2014; Wu and Aufses, 2012) focused on
pre-operative booking in the perioperative continuum as a source of wrong-site surgery defects.
All three called for a multidisciplinary team approach and standardized booking processes.
In a retrospective study, Brown et al. (2001) identified risks associated with surgical
interventions at two hospitals and two free-standing surgical centers in a U.S. urban healthcare
system. Investigators compared 30-day published surgical schedules with actual surgeries
performed to identify discrepancies that could lead to errors. Seven areas of potential risk were
identified, three of which involved aspects of scheduling and preoperative documentation. The
project task force found a lack of uniformity in the scheduling forms used by physicians’ offices
and surgical schedulers, with inconsistent and incomplete information provided. Scheduling
procedures reflected differences due to convenience, old habits, self-styled improvements, lack
of protocol awareness, and lax enforcement of standard procedures if they existed. An
improvement process was implemented with a single surgery scheduling form that met all site
requirements and could be used to schedule procedures at any site in the healthcare system.
Scheduling procedures were revised with the following points communicated and subject to
enforcement: only written scheduling on the approved form would be accepted; an amended
form must be used to correct errors, omissions, or make changes; incomplete forms or forms
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with abbreviations for left, right, or bilateral would be returned. Copies of the new forms and
explanations of enforcement were distributed to all physicians’ offices and unit managers. A
concurrent audit of all patients scheduled through the new preoperative process was conducted to
evaluate the risk reduction strategies. Data collected revealed the persistence of inconsistencies
from which an education, implementation, and monitoring program was developed. No data
were reported on subsequent changes in compliance or reduction in wrong-site surgery
incidence.
Clarke (2014) documented the effects of miscommunication between the surgeon’s office
and the operating suite on the occurrence of wrong-site surgeries. Data from a review of 541
wrong-site surgery procedures reported to the Pennsylvania Patient Authority from July 2004 to
June 2013 revealed 59 (11%) to be due to incorrect or incomplete information from the
surgeon’s office, significantly higher (p<0.001 by the chi-square test) than 8% for the wrong site
surgery registry. Information that was incorrect or insufficiently specific when scheduling or
obtaining consent was the most common defect, cited in 50 of the 59 cases. Compensation for
wrong-site surgery claims from the study that were brought to court and adjudicated averaged
$158,560.
Wu and Aufses (2012) analyzed surgical scheduling errors identified through the medical
event reporting system of a large U.S. academic and research medical center. Within 151
booking errors identified over a six-month period, the most common error was wrong side
booking (55, 36%), followed by incomplete information (38, 25%), wrong approach (15, 17%),
and wrong procedure (14, 9%).
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Perioperative Checklists
In a non-research review of 13 published articles on using perioperative checklists,
Spruce, (2014), synthesized several findings. One, the creation of a checklist is only the first
step. A checklist is merely a tool, and safe surgery cannot be achieved without team interest in
the tool and constant communication about its use. Two, an explanation of why the checklist was
created and a demonstration of the checklist used for processes in and around the operative
setting are necessary. Three, the checklist must be read and “checked” directly each time,
without fail. Four, checklists have greater value for multidisciplinary surgical teams than when
used for a process within a single discipline.
In a qualitative study to evaluate the effectiveness of checklist use in surgical settings,
Conley et al. (2011), conducted semi-structured interviews with implementation leaders (n=2),
surgeons (n=2), and an anesthesiologist in five Washington State hospitals. The hospitals
selected were urban (n=2), suburban (n=2), and rural (n=1); they ranged in size from less than 10
to more than 20 operating rooms. All five hospitals had initiated a surgical checklist
implementation process between December 2008 through January 2009. Interviews were
conducted with implementation leaders in September and October 2009 and with surgeons in
October and December 2009. Interviews were recorded, transcribed, and analyzed question by
question to identify distinguishing factors in the hospitals’ implementation processes. Results
were refined in an iterative process and compared with findings from the investigators’ previous
implementation research processes. Investigators identified seven characteristics of highly
effective safe surgery checklist processes: active leadership, pilot periods, deliberate enrollment
in checklist rollout, extensive discussion and training, multidisciplinary communication, realtime coaching, and ongoing feedback. The investigators’ original hypothesis, drawn from the
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work of others, that effective checklist processes would be characterized by dedicated resources,
frontline decision making, and local modification was not supported by Conley et al. 's study.
The investigators emphasized the importance of behavioral factors in highly effective checklist
implementation processes and the necessity for implementation leaders to clearly and repeatedly
explain why and show how to use safe surgery checklists.
Treadwell et al. (2014) conducted a systematic review of studies that described
experiences with surgical checklists and strategies for successful implementation. Thirty-three
studies returned from a search of the MEDLINE, CINAHL, EMBASE, and Cochrane Database
of Controlled Trials published between January 2000 and October 2012 were included in the
review. All studies described actual use of either the WHO checklist, the Surgical Patient Safety
System (SURPASS) checklist, a wrong-site surgery checklist, or an anesthesia equipment
checklist. The findings confirmed the association of checklists with increased detection of
potential wrong-site surgery errors, decreased surgical complications (e.g., unintended retention
of a foreign object), and better communication among the surgical team. Strategies for successful
checklist implementation that emerged from the review included engaging institutional leaders as
safe surgery champions, encouraging staff feedback on checklist implementation, considering
feedback for process and checklist adaptation, and avoiding redundancies in existing systems for
collecting information (e.g., multiple collection points for the same information). All the studies
were confined to processes and events within the surgical setting. None addressed pre-operative
booking forms or the role a standardized booking process might play in decreasing surgical
procedure errors in the perioperative continuum.
In a retrospective cohort study, Van Klei et al. (2014) investigated the extent to which
reductions in mortality attributed to the implementation of the WHO Safe Surgery checklist were
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related to checklist compliance. The study population was 25,513 adult patients undergoing nonday case surgery in a tertiary university hospital. Data were obtained from electronic patient
records and hospital administrative data. The main outcome measured was in-hospital mortality
within 30 days after surgery. Effect estimates were adjusted for patient characteristics, surgical
specialty, and comorbidity. After adjustments for baseline differences, mortality was
significantly decreased after checklist implementation (odds ratio 0.85 at 95% confidence level).
The effect was strongly related to checklist compliance and full checklist completion (0.44
association at 95% confidence level). The underlying takeaway from the study was the need for
full and consistent compliance with the WHO Surgical Checklist implementation to achieve the
intended outcomes.
DeVries et al. (2010) investigated surgical safety interventions outside the operating
room to establish if improvements in patient outcomes could be achieved by targeting the entire
surgical pathway. The pre/post study examined the effect on patient outcomes of a
comprehensive, multidisciplinary surgical safety checklist. The checklist was implemented in six
Netherlands academic centers and teaching hospitals with high standards of care. Results were
compared to a control group of five hospitals with similar characteristics. Outcome data were
collected from the prospective Dutch National Surgical Adverse Event Registration System
(LHCR), a nationwide registration system that has been in use for more than 10 years. Baseline
data were collected over three months for both sets of hospitals. Post-implementation data were
collected three months post-intervention. The total patient population studied in the six hospitals
was 3760 patients before implementation and 3820 patients post-implementation. The total
number of complications per 100 patients decreased from 27.3 (95% confidence interval) at
baseline to 16.7 (95% confidence interval) for an absolute risk reduction of 10.6 (95%
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confidence interval). In-hospital mortality decreased from 1.5% (95% confidence interval) to
0.8% (95% confidence interval), for an absolute risk reduction of 0.7 percentage points (95%
confidence interval). Outcomes did not change in the control group hospitals. The investigators
attributed the results to several factors, including the design of the checklist to incorporate all
existing protocols and checks to provide a comprehensive framework for the surgical pathway.
The continuity provided minimal information loss along the pathway and promoted
interdisciplinary communication. Many processes were optimized in the participating hospitals
by integrating discrete processes into a cohesive framework and standardization of protocols.
Paull et.al. (2014) explored why some wrong surgery events are not caught by the steps
of the Universal Protocol for safe surgery. The purpose of the study was to identify potential
safeguards to add precautions upstream and downstream of the surgical events that are the focus
of the protocol. In a retrospective study design, the U.S. Veterans Health Administration
database of root cause analyses was queried for all cases involving incorrect surgical procedures
between 2004 and 2013 to determine the relative frequency and characteristics of wrong surgery
events with origins upstream or downstream to the Universal Protocol. Events were sorted into
the two subgroups (upstream or downstream) by two clinicians with expertise in surgery and
patient safety. From the initial query return of 308 wrong-site surgery events, 48 cases (16%)
were identified as upstream or downstream errors, and further analyzed. Upstream errors
included mislabeling, while downstream errors were associated with ineffective surgical
processes. Surgical procedures that were particularly vulnerable to upstream or downstream
errors included wrong level spine operations, wrong patient prostatectomies, wrong implant
cataract procedures, and wrong-site skin lesion excisions. The recommendation from the
investigators to the healthcare industry is to engage in a complete assessment and
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implementation of safe behaviors that complement the surgical continuum and not to rely on the
Universal Protocol alone to ensure safe surgical procedures.
Clay-Williams and Colligan (2015) published a viewpoint paper in which they stated that
large-scale implementation of tools such as the Universal Protocol checklist in the hospital
setting is not as straightforward or effective as hoped or claimed. The authors argue that
checklists in healthcare are best reserved for simple, easy to follow, standardized, and time
critical processes. Expanding checklist use to complex and variable procedures may be confusing
and require advanced skills and team commitment to sustain. Combining linear procedures
(checklists) with complex processes (discussions) as attempted in safe surgery checklists
contradicts what the aviation industry has done, as those two components never cross in the
cockpit. Unlike aviation checklists, the Universal Protocol does not articulate clear roles for who
should initiate and complete each step or define who is responsible for the checklist (such as the
captain is inside the cockpit). In addition, the Universal Protocol does not afford individuals who
may need to be performing other tasks the ability to do so. The authors warn that patient safety
solutions will never be singular, straightforward, or self-sustaining given the complexity of
quality improvement in healthcare.
Human Factors
Dr. Ronald Wyatt, medical director, Office of Quality and Patient Safety of The Joint
Commission, evaluated the root cause analyses of all reported sentinel events (The Joint
Commission, 2015). The three most prevalent findings related to errors were human factors,
leadership, and communication. In Dr. Chassin’s 2013 article, he identified that within root cause
analyses, themes re-enforced the premise that the Universal Protocol, which focuses solely on
the pre-op setting the day of surgery and the operating room, misses an important entry point for
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errors. Chassin determined that those factors prior to the untoward event (such as pre-op
booking) must be examined. Leaders must evaluate human factor solutions to create a more
reliable tool to prevent that never event occurring again. Second, Chassin stated that US
regulatory bodies are not likely to positively affect patient safety unless they include Robust
Process Improvement® (RPI ®) (Appendix B). Chassin saw regulatory mandates that did not
incorporate RPI® as potentially obstructing progress toward High Reliable tenets. Third, Chassin
stated that High Reliability, as a systematically implemented process, requires an effort to
discover the causes of the failures within patient safety by focusing on the specified root cause.
Finally, Reason emphasized three key components for utilization when developing any tools for
use within healthcare (1990). Reason recommended ensuring these elements of Human Factors
are included within tools, by making sure they are knowledge-based, rule-based, and skill-based
(1990).
Reason (2000) cited two theories for humans to be fallible, the actual person or the
system. If the error is to be blamed on the person, there are the reasons for forgetfulness,
intentionality, or moral weakness that can be revealed. Suppose the error is found to lie within
the system. In that case, the explanations can be found in the conditions under which people are
forced to work and try to build defenses to deflect error or the effects of their errors (often
referred to as workarounds within healthcare). Reason states that healthcare should strive to
move toward the High-Reliability Organization (HRO) goal of zero preventable harm by
decreasing variability in human behavior.
Eltorai (2018) performed a qualitative study looking at aviation principles and lessons
translated into healthcare. Eltorai drew parallels between aviation and anesthesia (as the
principles of HRO do as well, in attempts to achieve zero preventable harm), looking at the crises
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that both the pilot and physician are potentially faced. Both are often charged with saving lives
and operating in a fog of unclear/incomplete direction. Eltorai stated that while many individuals
tout HRO within healthcare, there are still factors missing which they believe will propel
healthcare even farther toward zero preventable harm. One aspect highlighted here is that
accident reporting and investigations in healthcare must shift from siloed “self-evaluation” by a
risk manager within the organization where the mishap has occurred, to an outside agency
performing the RCA. Instead of current practice, and with great insight, Eltorai shared the need
for RCA decentralization from the organization itself wherein the members cannot be completely
objective. RCAs should shift to a centralized mechanism and investigating body, paralleling the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) accident investigation process.
Additionally, Eltorai included the benefits of simulation-based error analysis, which most
facilities are now capable of performing by video-taping simulation scenarios to evaluate these
errors in a no-harm, no-threat environment. This study offers a tremendous lesson learned in
healthcare from aviation. This literature highlights the angles of incorporating human factors
industries to afford systematic error review (Eltorai, 2018).
Robust Process Improvement®/Lean Six Sigma
In 2013, Dr. Chassin described the positive effects of the Targeted Solutions Tools®
(TST®s) which utilize the change management strategies of RPI® with components included
from Lean Six Sigma (LSS). The first TST® developed was with eight healthcare organizations
evaluating hand hygiene, whereby RPI® (a compilation of Lean, Six Sigma and Change
Management theories) was utilized with a noted 81% improvement with 11-month sustainment
after implementation. Surgical booking prior to RPI® had a 39% error rate noting after RPI®
there was a 21% error rate with a relative improvement of 46% (p= 0.000) in the article, Table 1
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shows these Improvements Seen in Four Projects Using RPI®.” (See Appendix C). Another
component cited within this article, and demonstrating the success of the TST®s, is the
adaptation and inclusion of High-Reliability Science into hospitals, with noted leadership
commitment, the incorporation of principles and practice of a safety culture, with widespread
deployment of performance improvement tools and methodology (Chassin, 2013).
Mason et al. (2014) reviewed 23 studies that evaluated LSS within healthcare. Six
common goals were identified: 1) optimize outpatient efficiency, 2) increase operating room
efficiency, 3) decrease complications associated with surgeries, 4) decrease inpatient-based
harms, 5) reduce mortality, and 6) limit unrequired costs and lengths of stay within the hospital.
The themes from these studies showed an 88% enhancement with LSS utilization and LSS
quality improvement initiatives, strongly correlating outcomes for post-operative patients.
High-Reliability Science/High-Reliability Organizations
High-Reliability Organizations (HROs) are fashioned after the aviation industry, where
zero failure can be tolerated. This HRO model is the direction experts are trying to drive
healthcare. Chassin et al. (2018) discussed the implementation of High-Reliability tenets within
healthcare, noting that Cincinnati Children’s Hospital decreased their serious safety events by
80% and realized an 80% decrease in lost time days after implementing HRO strategies. In
Houston, Texas, Memorial Hermann, The Woodlands, after implementing the HRO tenets,
realized their hand hygiene rate which began at 55%, increased to a 96% compliance rate. This
work then spurred a hospital within their enterprise to achieve zero bloodstream infections for 12
months and five facilities to achieve a 0% ventilator-associated pneumonia rate for a full year.
These were all directly attributed to their improved hand hygiene from the utilization of HRO
processes within healthcare. Noteworthy commonalities included: both institutions had great
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support and a very involved board, a multitude of safety initiatives (which included safety
huddles at hospital daily observation briefs), and both were consistently excellent, (safe across
all services and settings) (Chassin, et al., 2018). These components are also seen woven
throughout the SS TST® and are exemplified at the facility evaluating the SS TST®, whereby
senior leadership is intimately involved, there are observable inclusion of safety initiatives within
daily work, and patient and staff safety are a palpable priority.
Summary/Synthesis of the Evidence
Having multidisciplinary teams use a standardized written process for surgical scheduling
was the single method whereby facilities noted sustained success in decreasing risk for ‘never
events’ (Brown et al., 2001; Clarke, et al., 2014; Wu and Aufses, 2012). The impact of
preoperative booking errors on wrong-site surgeries is well documented (Conley et al., 2011;
Treadwell et al., 2014; Van Klei et al. 2014), while studies solely focused on the effect of nonstandardized processes within pre-operative booking are lacking. The review of literature
supported the need for consistent use of checklists (Spruce, 2014), the effects of human factors in
using checklists (Reason, 2000), and the positive outcomes utilizing the tenets of Robust Process
Improvement/Lean Six Sigma and High-Reliability Organization (Mason et al., 2014). Evidence
from the literature supports improving the process for pre-operative scheduling by standardizing
the pre-operative booking process.
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Rationale
Conceptual Framework
From themes identified in the review of the evidence, appropriate conceptual and/or
theoretical frameworks were selected to guide the project. Two theoretical frameworks were
chosen, the Donabedian Medical Quality Improvement Theoretical Framework to improve
patient and quality indicator outcomes and the Rogers Diffusion of Innovation Theory.
The Donabedian framework was introduced in 1966 by Avedis Donabedian, a doctor and
health services researcher. He set out with a strong determination to apply unbiased scientific
principles (i.e., “standards of quality”) to patient care to improve outcomes (AHRQ, 2015;
Berwick & Fox, 2015). The major concepts in the framework are structural measures, process
measures, and outcome measures (AHRQ, 2015). Structural measures contain the components of
evaluating health care, examining medical capabilities or methods, and implementing practices
that ensure safe, excellent value healthcare exists. Process measures are indicative of what a
healthcare worker may do to preserve or increase baseline healthy practices, for those not
seeking healthcare but health, or those in need of interface with the medical community for
evaluation or ongoing care, which will often include the utilization of established, evidencebased processes for care. Outcome measures indicate the overall effect and bearing the medical
continuum has on patients (AHRQ, 2015). This theoretical framework has quite a substantiated
history in its evolution and has been utilized successfully by healthcare organizations. Preoperative booking has many moving parts and human factors intertwined within its system, thus
evaluating the theoretical framework of the Donabedian model to improve patient and quality
indicator outcomes while implementing the SS TST® is applicable. Structure asks if we are
decreasing the possibility of harm in the healthcare setting.
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Process is asking what the predictive value is of performing as we have been trained
(with evidence-based practice). Outcome asks if our actions cause adverse outcomes and if so at
what interval and with what regularity. Then, looking at the framework in total, the question
asked is if a pre-operative booking process based upon evidence and High Reliability
Organization (HRO) tenets, especially in checklists, has created a safer, higher quality care
setting for patients. The Donabedian model aligns with the pre-operative booking defect quality
improvement project which strives to increase patient safety and the quality of care by
identifying entry points for errors in the preoperative booking process that can lead to WSS. In
many cases, pre-operative booking is a non-standardized, inefficient, and error-prone process.
Therefore, developing the structure needed to improve quality patient care by identifying and
targeting the risks identified in pre-operative booking enabled streamlining the processes of
surgical scheduling to facilitate safer patient outcomes.
The Rogers Diffusion of Innovation Theory (Rogers, 2003) was first introduced by
E.M. Rogers in 1962 and has become one of the most well-accepted explanations of the
continuum along which innovations are introduced and take hold. This theory is derived from the
science of communicating, explaining how, over a period, innovation ignites and diffuses among
a specific populace or formalized social structure. The five categories of “adopters'' are 1)
innovators, 2) early adopters, 3) early majority, 4) late majority, and 5)
laggards. Diffusion unravels itself in many ways and is extremely dependent on the types
of individuals and innovation-decision processes utilized. The SS TST® used in this project is
one tool that is dependent upon the dissemination of information. Any evaluation of the tool's
success must include where stakeholders are on the “adopter” continuum. The stakeholder tool
within the TST® has a scale built into an Excel spreadsheet that enables rating each stakeholder’s
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current level of buy-in to change (on a scale of zero to 10). The SS TST® required the project
manager to rate each stakeholder (see Appendix D stakeholder tool).
Section III: Methods
Context
The pre-operative surgical booking defect quality improvement project was implemented
at a >300-bed acute care hospital in Texas. The sponsor of the project and a key stakeholder was
the Chief Nursing Officer (CNO). Other key stakeholders for this project were the Director of
Perioperative Services, the Lead Surgical Scheduler, the Chief of the Medical Staff, a
service/product line physician champion (Orthopedics), the Director of Quality and Patient
Safety, Director of Patient Care, a Patient/Customer Experience champion, a Clinical
Informaticist, and the Surgical Liaison RN. Using the stakeholder analysis component of the SS
TST®, the DNP project lead assessed 10 stakeholders and found eight were aware of the need for
a process change and supportive of the proposed interventions.
Interventions
The quality improvement project was the implementation of the pre-operative booking
component of the Safe Surgery Targeted Solutions Tool® (SS TST®) to reduce variability in
surgical booking procedures, thus mitigating the risk of a wrong-site surgery or related “never”
event within the perioperative continuum (e.g., wrong-site surgery.) The intervention took place
in two settings: 1) a hospital scheduling office where booking forms and phone calls are received
and surgical procedures are scheduled, and 2) the physicians’ offices where the bookings and
booking forms originate.
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Safe Surgery Targeted Solutions Tool®
The Joint Commission Center for Transforming Healthcare (CTH) developed the Safe
Surgery Targeted Solutions Tool® (SS TST®) to map individual risk factors for wrong-site
surgeries to solutions that mitigate them. This tool was used to define and target specific risks in
the pre-op booking process of the microsystem for this project. Using the tool’s self-contained,
data-driven process, specific defects are identified, targeted solutions are implemented, outcomes
monitored, and sustainment strategies delivered. The SS TST® includes explanations of the
surgical booking audit checklists and a video, along with a return-back demonstration within the
tool. These components engaged the staff with the change management strategies CTH employs
in Robust Process Improvement (RPI®). The SS TST® is predicated on the premise that the
absence of a previous wrong-site surgery should not be taken as reassurance that it will not
occur. Evaluation of process accuracy must occur to recognize where the risk lies.
The SS TST® has a “Toolkit” containing elements that follow the LSS define, measure,
analyze, implement, and control (DMAIC) phases. Tab 1 is the “Define” Tab. The steps within
Tab 2, the “Measure” Tab, are where the baseline data was gathered. Tab 3 is the “Analyze” tab.
For the analysis phase of this project, proportion charts (p charts), Pareto charts, and analysis of
means (ANOM) charts were produced to determine baseline defect rates (Appendix E). During
this “Tab 3 phase,” the DNP project lead reviewed baseline data with the stakeholders to share
expertise on the two most prevalent defects identified. Those findings were: 1) Receipt of Form
Defects (surgeons’ offices not using any form, but rather calling surgical cases in to be booked)
and 2) missing or incorrect information IF surgical booking forms were used (Appendix F).
Following review and feedback from the stakeholders, the project lead mapped the targeted
solutions indicated by the defects and initiated the improvements. Tab 4 provided guidance and
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tools to “Implement” these solutions. The fifth tab is “Sustain the Gains,” which translates to the
“Control” phase of the define, measure, analyze, improve, control (DMAIC) sequence of Lean
Six Sigma.
Gap Analysis
The gap analysis included the steps of the quality improvement project, which also follow
the DMAIC concept within Lean, Six Sigma. In the Define portion of the gap analysis, the
current state was that the hospital perioperative staff were unaware that WSS risk events resided
within their realm of practice (Appendix G). The desired state was to introduce the SS TST® Preop Booking Project to the hospital with the goal that WSS events would never occur, especially
with surgical booking as a cause or contributing factor. Next, within the Measure portion of the
gap analysis, an assessment of existing literature regarding pre-op scheduling processes took
place, as there are not many studies to reference which have had successful measurable
outcomes. Additionally, noted within the current state, the DNP project lead measured hospital
baseline pre-op booking defects/risks for WSS from SS TST® entries, which required a minimum
of 100 initial observations entered by physician ID/code and service. To reach the desired state,
the determined risks were calculated and disseminated to stakeholders. Within the Analyze
phase, the current state demonstrated no apparent standardized methods utilized to schedule
surgical cases at the hospital. The desired state was to identify multiple entry points and methods
to schedule surgeries at the hospital and determine those root causes that could have contributed
to WSS within their perioperative arena. For the Implement Solutions current state, a change
management strategy was implemented at the hospital. The desired state was continued
implementation of the change strategy with targeted solutions throughout the hospital’s
perioperative process. Lastly, within the gap analysis's Control/Sustain Gains section, the
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current state recognized the hospital’s perioperative leadership as unfamiliar with the SS TST®
implementation guide. The desired state was consistent leadership facilitation of the
implementation guide and sustainment of the gains (e.g., process standardization).
Gantt Chart
The initial Gantt chart established during the third semester of the DNP program was
adjusted according to the time frame plausibility for the project lead and feedback from facility
key stakeholders as well as leaders from the CTH. The QI project was initially projected to take
16 weeks. After consultation, the original timeline was adjusted to 32 weeks to accommodate the
lack of consecutive weeks the project lead would be at the facility to perform the project,
COVID-19, and unanticipated events within the hospital. The Gantt chart displays actual
timeline adjustments, with key targets inclusive of prospectus, QI project text development, QI
project presentation, and graduation. See Appendix H for the Gantt Chart.
Work Breakdown Structure
The project lead was responsible for providing SS TST® orientation, direction, and
training on the tool related to the DMAIC principles and components built into the program. The
project lead evaluated all baseline pre-op booking defects to determine which targeted solutions
were required to mitigate those risks and evaluated post-intervention preoperative booking
defects to calculate the proportion chart, the Pareto chart, and the analysis of means (ANOM).
The Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) contributed to managing each deliverable for the project
(Appendix I). The WBS provided a visual tool to implement each step of the project (Martinelli
& Milosevic, 2016). The WBS outlined the achievement goal, project definition, and the steps
that followed, including the stakeholder analysis and charter development. The baseline number
and types of defects were determined, and the metrics were entered into the database to
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determine the next step, analyzing defects. In the analysis phase, the methods used to schedule
surgical cases were examined for root causes of defects. The most prevalent defects were
mapped to solutions. In the Implement Solutions phase, the project lead implemented the
solutions and shared best practices with the key stakeholders, with the intent to Control/Sustain
Gains.
Responsibility/Communication Plan
The DNP project lead was solely responsible for project communication (Appendix J).
The communication methods were virtual (via Zoom, Skype calls, phone calls), in person, and
written communication (email and texts). Key communication points were the stakeholder
kickoff meeting, the project charter development, the project status report, the project review,
and a debrief of project results. The DNP project lead conferred weekly with the DNP project
advisor and monthly with the hospital CNO, who facilitated communication at the corporate
level to help move the project forward and sustain the results. The Chief of the Medical Staff was
the project champion who communicated directly with the project surgeons. The Director of
Quality and Patient Safety introduced key members of the hospital and corporate staff to the
project lead to facilitate progress of the project. The Director of Perioperative Services, the
Director of Patient Care, the Lead Surgical Scheduler, and the Surgical Liaison RN were
instrumental in collecting and disseminating pre and post intervention statistics to all surgeons’
offices involved.
SWOT Analysis
A SWOT analysis was conducted to understand issues with potential impact on the
project. The organization’s strengths were within the CNO and Director of Perioperative
Services' supportive leadership and key stakeholder awareness of known risk for lack of a
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standardized pre-op booking process (Appendix K). The organization is very performanceimprovement-driven and a Magnet© Recognition Facility. An area of weakness was the project
lead not knowing the CMO or any product line chiefs. The project lead did not have internal
contacts with staff as an employee and thus originally lacked the ability to obtain information
informally or make spur-of-the-moment observations.
Opportunities were determined to be the project leader's ability to leverage evidencebased quality improvement methods from other organizations (e.g., The Joint Commission and
the Center for Transforming Healthcare). There was an opportunity for the project lead to
publish aggregate findings from other organizations to add to the body of knowledge on
mitigating risks from pre-operative booking defects. Other opportunities were being able to share
best practices from external organizations. Threats included inadequate evidence in the literature
on surgical booking as a contributing factor for WSS, and lack of awareness by hospital system
leadership of pre-operative booking as a risk factor warranting attention, limiting the ability to
scale the project. As there were multiple entry points (approximately 60 for this facility) and
scheduling modalities for surgical scheduling, physician offices often had no direct affiliation
with the location where surgery is performed, confusion and miscommunication did increase the
risk of WSS.
Budget
The first component evaluated with the budget included the staff who were required to
contribute time to the success of this project (Appendix L). This budget included the project lead
obtaining baseline and post-intervention data and communicating project status for 40 hours per
week for 2 weeks per month ($4,480/month x 10 months) for a total of $44,800. Three outside
consultants provided consultation, these consisted of a Registered Nurse consultant with a phone
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call 1 hour/month for 4 months = $224, and a Data Analyst consultant who performed data
extraction for 1 hour/week for 10 months for 4 weeks per month (once a week) = $2400, and the
other was a Director within the outside consultant group who provided project oversight 1
hour/week for 10 months x 4 weeks per month = $4800. The Perioperative Director met with the
project lead 1 hour/ week for 10 months x 2 weeks per month = $2400. CNO
guidance/support/Stakeholder update meeting 2 times/month for 10 months = x4 hours/month 2
x’s/month = $4800. The Anesthesia Champion attended the stakeholder update meeting once a
month x 10 months = $3650. The Chief of the Medical Staff met with the project lead 2 times/
month x 2 hours = $1471.80 to review progress and facilitate project continuation. The hospital
surgical schedulers met with the project lead for 8 hours/month x 10 months = $1325.60, and the
physician office surgical schedulers met 4 hours/month x 10 months = $662.80. This total cost
for staff to implement the project totals $66,534.20. The second component was a corporate IT
investment estimated at $67,520.00 within the initial year launch to update the surgical
scheduling website, bringing the first-year total investment cost estimate to $134,064.20, with a
three-year cost of implementation projection totaling $202,411.20.
In addition to the costs projected to implement the SS TST®, each WSS comes with the
estimated average cost as greater than $179K per case (Mehtsun, 2013). With a consistent
estimate of 40-50 WSSs within the United States every week, this totals over $465M in tangible
costs per year (The Joint Commission, 2020).
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Study of the Interventions
The rationale for choosing these interventions was the evidence-based efficacy of the
SS TST®, its demonstrated validity, and its direct correlation decreasing risks of never events
after implementation of the targeted solutions. The approach chosen to assess the impact of
the interventions was gathering the post-intervention data to measure an anticipated decrease
in defect rate. The data would also provide information on changes in surgical schedulers’
satisfaction with preoperative booking post-intervention. The approach used to establish
whether the observed outcomes were due to the interventions was using the built-in
mechanism for calculations within the SS TST® and collecting responses from the surgical
schedulers.
Outcome Measures
The outcome measures (number and types of pre-booking defects) were illustrated with
proportion-charts (p charts), Pareto charts, and analysis of means (ANOM) diagrams (Appendix
M). Rationale for expressing the outcomes this way was that these charts and diagrams are built
into the SS TST® and show the change from baseline defects to post-intervention improvements
as a quantitative indicator of mitigating WSS risk. These measures were created and validated by
CTH to evaluate the effectiveness of implementing the targeted solutions, thus, no new measures
needed to be developed or validated for this project. CTH has determined the accuracy of data
for the project work to have a p-value of 0.000 of 0.000. A table showing the p-value calculation
is presented as Appendix C.
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Data Collection Instruments
The Center for Transforming Healthcare provided the data collection instruments where they
have undergone validation from pilot facilities (Appendix N). These tools have had their
reliability proven by measuring the process and outcomes over the past ten years with over 70
facilities throughout the US. The measures chosen were the product lines at this facility with the
greatest number of cases with laterality: orthopedics and cardiovascular services. The operational
definitions are provided within the Safe Surgery Data Collection training module, and the
qualified data collectors then enter data into this worksheet based upon their observations. The
requirement from the CTH is at least 100 observations over at least two weeks are obtained to
gather baseline and post-intervention data. The DNP project lead created the data collection
instrument to evaluate surgical schedulers under the guidance of the project committee chair. An
analysis of quantitative and qualitative data obtained from the surgical scheduler staff related to
staff satisfaction with their training and role satisfaction with the current processes and
subsequent satisfaction with the changes to the workflow were measured.
Analysis
A mixed-methods study was performed. The quantitative testing measured the percentage
of risk for never events. A quantitative and qualitative study was performed pre- and postintervention to evaluate surgical scheduler satisfaction utilizing the SS TST®. The quantitative
data analysis was performed using the Microsoft Excel Mini tab in the SS TST® to collate and
extrapolate the data. Qualitative data was collected and analyzed to determine perceived risks,
methods, and processes whereby the physician office scheduling staff viewed the importance of
their role within the surgery scheduling process. See Appendix O for Surgical Scheduler Pre and

36

Post Intervention Data and Appendix P for Surgical Scheduler Quality Improvement
Questionnaire.
Ethical Considerations
An initial review by the project lead and project sponsor did not reveal any ethical
considerations that indicated the need for a formal ethics review. No conflicts of interest were
identified. Data collected was masked (using patient codes and a numeric coding system for both
the hospital and pilot physicians alike) and aggregated to avoid any breach of confidentiality,
standard practice embedded in the SS TST®. All data shared externally is anonymous and shared
with the explicit permission of the hospital. The data used in this study is aggregated and deidentified; no representation can be made to the type of facility where defects were identified.
Hospital staff (the three in-house schedulers and the Administrative Assistant to the Director of
Perioperative Services) who entered data or comments have their anonymity protected through
masking codes. The DNP project lead has an Affiliation Agreement with both the hospital and
the Joint Commission Center for Transforming Healthcare (Appendix Q).
Another component within ethical consideration includes beneficence. Beneficence is
defined within Grace’s text, this is a component of ethics, which urges those employed within
the healthcare setting, to continue towards goals that were originally set forth to provide a
service that ensures the patients’ greatest interests (2018). By measuring and identifying the
greatest risks for wrong-site surgeries, evaluating the methods employed from surgeons’
offices to the hospital, the facility targeted the two highest risk categories at the entry point for
surgery scheduling. This ethical principle was met because it is certainly within the best
interest of the patients to alleviate any known, preventable risk to avoid the potential for a
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wrong-site, wrong-side, wrong-approach, wrong-procedure event (also known as “never
events”).
Autonomy is the ethical principle to ensure a patient’s authority to be cared for in a
dignified and respectful manner (Grace, 2018). An effort whereby respecting all patients
regarding their treatment includes their inherent trust in the healthcare professionals to reduce
or eliminate anything known to be a risk. Implementing the safe surgery scheduling tool was a
pointed example of how patients’ dignity and respect increased as their risk was decreased.
The ethical principle known as veracity entails availing the truth to patients and
allowing them transparent information regarding their health and care requirements (Grace,
2018). This principle enabled the autonomy and propagated patients being able to make
informed decisions. Over the past year, patients have given pointed feedback on their postoperative surveys. Because the pre-operative process has been very disjointed, they have
questioned faith in the pre-operative process. It added to their being more apprehensive on
their day of surgery. This apprehension was a driving force in the Customer Satisfaction
revamping of this pre-op process to make it more streamlined, standardized, and safer. Giving
these patients this transparency that a performance improvement process has been put into
place emphasizes veracity with this population.
The concept of restorative or compensatory justice involves reinstating that entity to
people which they may have lost due to the actions or inactions of others (Grace, 2018). This
principle can be applied both to patients and staff members alike. This project targeted the
patients, to reinstate trust and satisfaction with this facility, which was diminished due to the
fractured management of this process. The physician office and hospital surgical scheduling
staff had decreased faith in the system, as they have tried to implement online scheduling to be
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the norm versus telephonic scheduling, to decrease risk and disparate verbal surgical bookings
actual orders received within the Pre-Admit Clinic. The tenet of “justice as fairness,” was
inclusive as this project ensured fairness and equitability were ingrained across this continuum
of decreasing risk of never events.
This project sought to ensure psychological safety also for the patients and staff
members. “Psychological safety is the shared belief that the team is safe for interpersonal risktaking. Its presence improves innovation and error prevention” (Grailey, et al., 2021). The
patients require psychological safety as they undergo surgery, giving their lives totally and
completely to the anesthesia and surgical staff. This project supports psychological safety by
providing staff and patients the knowledge and confidence risks for WSS have been
thoroughly evaluated, measured, and mitigated by utilization of this methodology.
There are six values known as the principles of the Jesuits (Creighton University, n.d.).
First, may we advocate for our patients, may it be “Ad Majorem Dei Gloriam for the Greater
Glory of God.” The SS TST® is allowing pre-operative booking staff, by reducing risk, to be
bold patient advocates. As Florence Nightingale wrote in her diary, “Let me only accomplish the
Will of God,” as we care for patients who are the center core of this project, may we only strive
to do what we do, for our patients and our fellow healthcare providers “For the greater glory of
God,” and not ourselves (Wellman, 1999). Another Jesuit principle is, “Forming and Educating
Agents of Change: Teaching behaviors that reflect critical thought and responsible action on
moral and ethical issues.” This principle drives what we do as healthcare educators, and as this
DNP project lead has educated surgical booking staff as to what an important job they hold in
minimizing or eliminating risk for WSS. An effort to help shape our current and future
healthcare professionals by educating them to become, “Agents of Change” especially within
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today’s world where moral and ethical matters (e.g., to keep our patients free from wrong-site
surgeries) are more pertinent to address than ever before in the history of our lives.
The ANA Ethical Standards has nine provisions, of which several were relevant to this
project. Provision 1 is, “Respect for Others” with these items listed within the subsets.1.1 The
Respect for Human Dignity,1.2 Relationships with Patients,1.3 The Nature of Health,1.4 The
Right to Self-Determination, and 1.5 Relationships with Colleagues and Others. Respect for
others is undoubtedly number one on ANA’s list of ethical standards. Healthcare professionals
must first and foremost respect others in every situation, if even respectfully disagreeing, and
advocate for patients, families, and staff members. Focusing on provision 1.5 allows for all we
meet, we must respect, especially regarding relationships with colleagues, advocating for patient
safety and striving to alleviate any deviation or potential for WSS. The second Provision is:
“Commitment to the Patient,” with these items listed as subsets: 2.1 Primacy of the Patient’s
Interests, 2.2 Conflict of Interest for Nurses, 2.3 Collaboration, and 2.4 Professional Boundaries.
Commitment to the patient is a primary focus within the project and ensures the highest quality,
most informed, and safe care possible. This commitment comes in education to the patient care
teams including surgical schedulers and all within the perioperative continuum. Allocating
resources and educational training modules is an aspect of commitment to the patient,
considering WSS prevention. The third Provision is: “Advocacy for the Patient.” 3.1.4
Professional Responsibility in Promoting a Culture of Safety, demonstrated by advocating for
patients is an ethical provision whereby nurses must act in support of patients, by utilizing
evidence-based practice for surgical scheduling for potentially vulnerable patients.
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Section IV: Results
The needs identified for this intervention, which were determined from the gap analysis,
came first from the lack of identification and evaluation of inherent risk for WSS with targeted
solutions (Appendix R), and second from the risk of lack standardization of the surgical booking
process with a targeted solution. An additional gap was identified three months into this project
as an informatics lack of agility. Most office surgical schedulers were not granted access to a
surgical procedure request via the preferred online method. Additionally, the project lead
collected qualitative data on the level of training and satisfaction of surgical schedulers with the
pre-intervention process. Levels of training and satisfaction were measured again postintervention to ascertain changes in schedulers’ perspectives towards their positions and the
scheduling process at large.
The process measure findings for the SS TST® were gathered from the baseline data.
Targeted solutions were then put into place for the two identified greatest risks for this facility.
The baseline data for 100 scheduled surgical cases revealed 70% of surgeries were scheduled
over the phone (see Appendix E). The SS TST® showed that the greatest measured risks were: 1)
the risk of verbal/telephonic surgical scheduling, and 2) lack of or misinformation and no written
changes when made to the surgery schedule. These highlighted the targeted solutions put into
place. The initial findings from the six surgery schedulers revealed three had over three years in
their positions and three respondents had less than three years performing surgical scheduling.
Experienced schedulers had higher job satisfaction levels than those with fewer years’
experience (Appendix P).
The SS TST® timeline for the initial steps was adjusted as described in the Gantt Chart
narrative and may be visualized within the SS TST® Project Timeline Diagram (Appendix G).
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The project lead was able to meet with one of the surgical schedulers, the Surgery Liaison RN,
the Director of Quality and Patient Safety, and the Performance Improvement Director in
January 2021 to conduct a project mapping session as a starting point (Appendix S). The PreAdmit Clinic (PAC) performed chart reviews prior to surgery and identified incorrect booking
(CPT) codes which translated as errors (defects/risks) from scheduling to the patient going to
Pre-Op. There was no way to verify a verbal booking. The project lead also completed the SS
TST® Charter evaluation tool in January 2021.
The initial steps of the interventions from each of these findings were to go to the providers’
offices in April 2021 to share the findings (Appendix T), share the risk, and request their
participation in the pilot study to afford them the ability to participate in this project. All office
surgical schedulers agreed to join the pilot project at this time, understanding the WSS risk, but
only one office began utilizing the form. During the in-person visit in April, the DNP project
lead disseminated the anonymous questionnaires to the surgical schedulers to determine baseline
qualitative data (refer to Appendix O). To ensure anonymity the project lead had the schedulers
mail their documents. Six of the eight schedulers returned the questionnaire (75% response rate),
which was valuable in making recommendations to the Corporate Patient Experience Team and
the Corporate IT/ISD Team with which the project lead was working. The initial findings also
revealed scheduler overall satisfaction with online written versus verbal booking of surgical
cases. Three of the five (60% response rate) post-intervention questionnaires distributed were
returned (of note three of the original office schedulers vacated their positions during the project
timeline). The SS TST® post-intervention surgical scheduler findings showed the surgical
scheduler levels of experience were evenly distributed. The common post-intervention findings
revealed the schedulers preferred the online/written method of surgical booking to alleviate
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errors and disparities between those phoned in versus booked electronically. Unanimously
(100%) of the schedulers recognized the benefits of booking electronically versus over the
telephone. These findings also solidified the premise predicated by the SS TST®. The corporate
IT Team is still currently working to streamline this process to support both the office and inhospital schedulers due to the findings discovered during this project. The SS TST® postintervention data reviewed 148 scheduled surgical cases, which decreased from an 88% error rate
to a 41% error rate for surgical cases which were scheduled verbally. The overall results show a
relative improvement of 53.4% over a three-month period.
Modifications had to be made to the project. Most changes were made due to unanticipated
events (internal, weather, COVID-19) and poor utilization of the form. Multiple challenges were
ensuring all the pilot offices would use the SS TST® scheduling form. The impact of COVID-19
on surgical scheduling had an outsized effect on the project throughout the implementation
phase. A surge of COVID patients impacted the entire operations of the project facility from July
through October 2021. All non-emergent surgeries were canceled, and no new surgeries could be
booked. The recovery room was converted to a COVID unit. The operating room nurses were
being utilized elsewhere in the hospital, again requiring a timeline and project plan modification.
Contextual elements that interacted with the interventions and could account for the
outcomes/delays in progress for this project had an unequivocal underpinning of the effects of
COVID on the medical communities at large. The project lead found literature that shared the
same phenomenon worldwide due to the pandemic. Surgeries were cancelled and prioritization
of cases (oncology patients for example) which were allowed to be scheduled (only on a case-bycase basis) were defined and authorized in a parallel manner which is described by Soreide, et al
(2020). Soreide discussed the undiscovered fallout and succession of outcomes that cannot be
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measured yet, due to the delay in surgeries for so many patients. The model, “Pandemic burden
and impact on surgical services,” (Appendix V) found within Soreide’s article highlight the
cascade of events which would be perpetuated by continued delay or cancelation of surgical
procedures for those requiring surgical interventions (Soreide, et al., 2020).
There were several observed associations between outcomes, interventions, and
contextual elements, the greatest of which was inconsistent continuity in project progression due
to the lack of the project lead being on-site continuously during the project; this was not
favorable for project forward movement. The project lead did not have direct authority with any
of the staff members responsible for the project's success. The project lead was reliant upon
others, and as such the project lead realized the project was likely not as successful, progress did
not occur as rapidly as possible. Contextual elements played a large part in this project.
Another phenomenon which added to the outcome timeline and the interventions, was
that the project lead discovered that Rogers' theory of Diffusion was a key player in getting buyin and acceptance of the change required from the office schedulers. The project lead realized the
importance of following the SS TST® recommendations from the targeted solutions. Those
recommendations required a mandate of intervention implementation within one month of
obtaining baseline data. The DNP project lead realized the necessity of being more vigilant in
implementing that portion of the timeline would have avoided the prolonged implementation
phase of this project. The project lead realized that the SS TST® was the project lead’s
innovation and vision, yet that did not make this everyone else’s project.
Eight months into the project, the project lead was made aware of multiple emails sent
back and forth among the pre-admit clinic nurses and the hospital surgical schedulers. These
emails revealed the discrepancies between the phoned-in surgeries scheduled and what was
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documented on the surgical consent and orders obtained in the PAC. Identifying these
discrepancies was an eye-opening event for both the DNP project lead and the Risk Management
Director when these were quantified (over 70 within 3 months). Another lesson learned through
this process was that the surgical schedulers realized “surgical set cards” are a “guess” because
there are numerous options to pull from and no direction from the surgeons’ schedulers when
scheduling surgery. This lack of direction can and has caused the incorrect surgical sets to be
pulled for cases if not scrutinized and caught by the perioperative nursing team during surgical
schedule review “huddle” the business day prior to the surgeries.
The unintended consequences, including the benefits, problems, failures, or costs
associated with the interventions, and how these were mitigated, were widespread. The benefits,
which were not something the project lead envisioned being a by-product, were that the PreAdmit Clinic, by joining forces with this project, was able to increase procurement of orders for
patients arriving for their Pre-Admit appointments. There was a noted improvement of
approximately 95%, according to the Surgical Liaison RN, from the pilot offices the project lead
interfaced with, who were unaware of the impact of not sending orders promptly, and this was a
tremendous, unexpected win. The problems, as discussed prior, were the lack of ability of the
DNP project lead to have continuous effort to move the project forward, sometimes with greater
than a month with no interaction with the pilot offices. The project could and likely would have
been successful far earlier if the project lead was onsite every day for the SS TST® 16-week
timeline. This schedule was adjusted to meet the realistic timeline in which the project lead could
be on site. The failures discovered also tied in with the lack of onsite continuity and a personal
understanding of the facility’s process flow, the key players involved, and the best mechanism to
aid the office schedulers with a user-friendly pilot form. The form given to the office schedulers
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was a Microsoft Word® document with shifting fields to be populated. As such, it drove some
schedulers to hand-write in their surgical scheduling information. The mitigation for this was to
work with the hospital clinical informaticist to produce a populatable form, or perhaps drive the
actual update of the scheduling link to move faster than planned, as IT saw this as a stumbling
block well.
The initial improvement plan evolved. The project lead presented to the hospital
leadership in May 2021 and shared that the implementation phase of the new form would be
captured during that month, with post-intervention feedback being captured, collated, and
calculated within the month of June 2021. The project lead planned a follow-up presentation of
post-intervention findings to the leadership team again in July 2021, which was delayed due to
the abovementioned situations. Thus, alternative change strategies were considered and rejected,
pushing the implementation phase into July with those reasons mentioned above. This evolution
occurred because of lack of compliance and the project lead was solely responsible (with the
guidance of the Chief of the Medical Staff) for this change of plans.
The noted effects the changes and improvements had on clinical and organizational
outcomes and processes included discovering lack of preoperative booking standardization
throughout the corporate entity. The Corporate IT office realized there was a process developed
and shared throughout the corporation to improve how the office surgical schedulers entered
their surgical requests. Still, this process was not being utilized uniformly. For example, the
hospital where the project lead was implementing the project, started with a 70% verbal
scheduling measurement. When the project lead shared this metric with a corporate clinical
informaticist, it was realized that the central corporate hospital location had an average 90%
online scheduling process which was presumed, in error, to be the norm throughout the corporate
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facilities. This concern was ultimately shared with the hospital where the project lead was
inculcated. The modality which was used at the central corporate hospital was implemented with
a 53.4% relative improvement demonstrated at the SS TST® project site. The professional
outcomes and processes were considered a win across the corporate enterprise as the leadership
saw the initial data and supported the change, which was implemented, for a marked decrease in
risk for Wrong-Site Surgeries among their facilities.
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Section V: Discussion
Summary
This project demonstrated the tireless efforts that must go into change management, even
when the risks are clearly identified. It is the opinion of the DNP project lead that the SS TST® is
a tool that could not succeed without a committed team of leadership and implementation
advocates. Despite meeting many obstacles, the executive team never took focus off the
identified risk. Using the Facilitating Change® Model, this team was able to drive change by
becoming aware of and alleviating factors contributing to risk.
Interpretation
The nature of associations between the interventions and the outcomes revealed a direct
correlation between decreasing risk of WSS and preventing never events. The impact of the
project on people and systems was more efficient communications. The Chief of Medical Staff
has defined this as a target during the two-year tenure in this position to streamline the entire
perioperative continuum, focusing on the preoperative booking as a first step to improve and
accomplish this goal. The Director of Quality and Patient Safety stated this project has unearthed
many hidden risks and made such a difference in how the facility views the perioperative
process, and views this as a breakthrough in how the facility will handle preoperative booking in
the future.
There were multiple reasons for differences between observed and anticipated outcomes
directly due to context. The strongest reason identified throughout the entire implementation and
closure of this project was the unanticipated lack of compliance with the pilot offices' request
and the need to have an authoritative mandate to require these offices to comply. The project
lead anticipated a much more robust desire to comply than was discovered. The pandemic's
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impact on all healthcare workers included vast numbers of cancellations and rescheduling of
cases for surgical patients. The costs and strategic trade-offs included the project lead engaging
with the non-compliant offices three times to ask them to comply. The opportunity costs were the
time and effort involved with the quantified cost avoidance from a WSS. The implications of
these findings for the leadership of change decrease the risk for a never event. The facility will
need to assign staff to sustain these gains after the project lead completes this initial project.
Assumptions were made that all staff would see the risk and want to comply, this did not end up
uniformly being the case.
The findings supported the Donabedian Medical Quality Improvement Theoretical
Framework and Rogers Theory of Diffusion beyond the project lead’s expectations. One of the
five office schedulers was an “innovator,” who used the new form immediately, gave constant
feedback on how the form could be better laid out, and information which could be added. This
scheduler was motivated by the possibility of change and wanted to reduce the risk of medical
errors. Two of the five office schedulers were the “late majority.” They did not schedule enough
cases at this facility to grasp the concept of how much they played a part in accepted risk for
WSS. The project director communicated with them during the implementation, and after
approximately three months, they saw the benefit and began scheduling online on the approved
form. The last two schedulers, who booked the most surgeries, were “laggards.” They did not
want to participate, their employers supported continuation of verbal scheduling, and they
preferred to call rather than book online. The pilot form given to these five schedulers was not in
an optimal format for use. One of the two “laggards” filled out the form twice and reverted to
calling, and the other scheduler refused completely to book online until it was mandated by
office leadership. Consistent with the premise of Roger’s Theory of Diffusion, it was necessary
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to take different approaches and provide different explanations of why schedulers should not be
booking via telephone to move towards adoption.
The inferences from this work regarding means necessary to sustain the spread of the new
levels of performance are pointedly described with the leadership requirement above, to appoint
a staff member as the maintaining force to ensure all physician offices eventually adopt and
comply with online booking versus verbal booking. The DNP project lead is hopeful this
improvement will be spread to other facilities within the corporate entity. The implications of
this work for future professional staff development entail assigning a ‘point person’ to monitor
and sustain the gains and potentially assign a member within the Pre-Operative department at the
hospital to continue this initiative and ultimately roll out the other three components within the
SS TST®, completing the full purpose for which the SS TST® was created.

50

Limitations
The most notable limitation was a lack of buy-in from two physicians’ offices to
implement the targeted solutions. Data were gathered pre-and post-implementation and
schedulers in the physician offices were encouraged to implement the targeted solutions, but
it was at their discretion. A change in the overall makeup of surgical cases affected the types
of booking defects identified and limited the generalizability of the results. The COVID-19
pandemic imposed a third limitation with multiple surges, which resulted in the cancellation
of elective surgeries, a great proportion of which were orthopedic. Internet and email
limitations at specific providers offices reduced their surgical scheduling staff’s ability to
comply with the requested pilot utilization of the on-line surgical scheduling form. The bias
this creates from being unable to access the internet or the approved online form skews the
data due to these offices lacking technological resources to perform their jobs.
Conclusions
The purpose of the project was to standardize preoperative booking processes to decrease
the risk for never events. The project demonstrated utilization of the SS TST® improved
standardization and decreased risks for wrong-site surgeries. The results were consistent with
evidence from the literature, and expectations from the project lead, which predicted a marked
reduction in risk from standardizing the preoperative booking process. The short-term
implications of this project were the introduction of a practical way for both in-hospital and
surgeon office schedulers to decrease risks of wrong-site surgeries. This risk was remedied by
implementing a surgical booking form, including all required patient information and complete
surgical scheduling components needed for the operative team executing the surgical procedures
within the OR. Few studies have examined the impact of standardizing preoperative booking
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processes on decreasing this WSS risk, providing an opportunity for future research to close this
gap. Integrating a standardized preoperative booking process into “standard work” is necessary
to sustain the process improvement demonstrated by the DNP project.
Section VI: Funding
The project did not receive any formalized funding. The project lead volunteered
personal time and efforts for this project. The hospital funded the project with time and staff
members required to support the necessary efforts to complete this risk evaluation. The outside
consultant leaders and the support provided by the stakeholders was part of their salaried
positions. The opportunity exists for future grant funding or salaried positions to assist with
continuing this evaluation to reduce identified risks for a continued Safe Surgery program
enterprise wide.
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communicatio
n

-Mean case
times
(including
anesthesia and
surgery times)
decreased by
10.1% with
TS
-Pt safety
issues were
identified
during postop briefings
and were
analyzed
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-Large scale
implementatio
n has
conflicting
outcomes that
suggest tools
(checklists)
are not as
simple or
effective as
hoped
1. World
Health
Organization
(WHO)
Universal
Protocol (UP)

1. Back to
Basics:
Reserve the
checklists
(tools) for
processes/pro
cedures not
discussion
with simple
easy to
follow,
standardized
processes

Complex quality/safety
solutions are never
--a) singular
--b) straightforward
--c) simple to sustain

Level I, AHigh Quality
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Structure
varies design
with aviation
checklists as
it combines
procedures
(which are
linear) and
then includes
within
checklists
formal team
discussion
(which
aviation sees
as briefings,
which execute
a complex
process,
which
aviation
NEVER
mixes in the
cockpit)
2. The roles
within the UP
are not clear
(who reads,
checks,
validates the
checklist?)
3.
Compliance
requires boxes
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to be checked
(so team
member is not
able to
perform other
tasks, which
they may be
needed to
perform
during the
time they are
completing
the checklist)
4. Requires a
Time Out:
ALL must
stop, and this
is not
necessarily
feasible in an
emergent
situation due
to extreme
time pressure
7. Chassin,
et al.
(2013)

Mixed
5 Hospitals
Methodologie 3 ASCs
s Qualitative
and
Quantitative

1.Using RPI
improvements
in outcomes
have been
noted
2. RPI is a
combination
of:
a) Lean

1.First 4
n/a
projects (see
First TST RPI
attachment)
-surgical
booking prior
to RPI 39%
error rate after
RPI 21%

Level I, AHigh Quality
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b) Six Sigma
c) Change
Management
2. Operations
on WSP
approx. 50x’s
week – Mn
Dept of
Health (2013)
High
Reliability
Healthcare
Maturity
Model
3. Adapting
High
Reliability
Science to
hospitals
a) leadership
commitment
b) incorporate
principles/pra
ctice of safety
culture
throughout
the
organization
c) widespread
adoption and
deployment
was most
effective PI

error rate with
a relative
improvement
of 46%
(p= .000)
2. Regulatory
mandates are
unlikely to be
effective in
RPI efforts as
they should
focus on
elements of
RPI not
obstruction of
progress
toward high
reliability
3. HR w/ RPI
is a
systematic
attention to
uncovering
the very
specific
causes of the
failures of the
safety
processes, and
can pinpoint
specific
causes
4. Fires in
ORs ~600
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8. Chassin.
(2018)

Qualitative

n/a
Zero harm
goal

tools and
methods

x’/yr (ECRI
Institute,
2013)

-Cincinnati
Children’s
Serious Safety
Events (SSEs)
decreased by
80% and 80%
decrease in
lost time days
after
implementing
HR principles
-Memorial
Hermann
Health
System’s
(MHHS) hand
hygiene (HH)
compliance
improved
from a 58%
rate to a 96%
compliance
rate, one
hospital
within the
system had
zero Central
Line
Bloodstream
Associated

-Both
n/a
institutions
had:
-- a high
degree of
board
involvement
--a large
number of
safety
initiatives
including
safety huddles
at hospital
daily
observation
briefs
--were
consistently
excellent and
safe across all
services and
settings

Level III, AHigh Quality
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Infections for
12 months,
and five
hospitals had
zero
ventilatorassociated
pneumonias
for 12 months
directly
attributed to
improved HH
9. Mason, et Qualitative
al. (2014)

Of 124
studies found
with 8
database
searches,
23 were
suitable for
inclusion
within this
article:
11-Lean
6- Six Sigma
6- Lean Six
Sigma (LSS)

-Six common
aims:
1. optimize
outpatient
efficiency
2. improve
OR efficiency
3. decrease
operative
complications
4. decrease
ward-based
harms
5. decrease
mortality
6. limit
unnecessary
costs and
length of stay

-Major studies
(88%)
demonstrate
improvement
by utilizing
LSS within
healthcare
-LSS QI
methodologie
s have
potential to
have
clinically
significant
improvement
for surgical
patients
-LSS and SS
prominent QI
methodologie
s demo’d

-Selection bias due to being
Level V, Ahospital-based patients
High Quality
-Possible QI strategies could
be utilized in other specialties
as not isolated to being helpful
in surgical setting
-In noting underreporting of
QI research, and finding 88%
statistically significant
improvement in this study
with principles, more research
should be considered
-Marked variations in settings
for these QI studies
interventions and countries
where operated
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across several
areas of
healthcare
since 1998,
use has
increased by
more than ½
within the last
four years
(reported in
2013)
10. Reason.
(2000)

Qualitative

n/a
“Human Error
Models and
Management”

-2 approaches
to human
fallibility:
a) Personblame
forgetfulness,
intention,
moral
weakness
b) Systemconcentrate
conclusions
on the
conditions
under which
individuals
work AND
try to build
defenses to
avert errors or
mitigate their
effects

-Human Behavior
Countermeasu
res directed at
decreasing
unwanted
variability in
human
behavior

Level III, AHigh Quality
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-Strive
towards HRO
principles
11. Treadwell Systematic
, et al.
Review of
(2014)
Literature

-Summarized
four databases
from 1
January 2000
to 26 October
2012
--33 studies
--Utilizing
UP, Surgical
Patient Safety
System
(SURPASS),
a wrong-site
surgery
checklist, or
an anesthesia
equipment
checklist were
eligible for
inclusion
-- also
included
articles
describing use
of anesthesia
checklists to
detect
equipment
failure in

-Surgical
checklists
represent a
relatively
simple and
promising
strategy for
addressing
surgical
patient safety
worldwide.
-Beneficial
effects
strongly
recommend
R/T checklist
compliance/c
ompletion
-Further
studies are
needed to
evaluate to
what degree
checklists
improve
clinical
outcomes and
whether
improvements

-In
industrialized
countries, the
rate of
perioperative
death directly
due to
inpatient
surgery has
been
estimated at
0.4–0.8%, and
the rate of
major
complications
has been
estimated at
3–17%.1
complications
include:
-wrong
patient/proced
ure/site
surgery
-anesthesia
equipment
problems

-Checklists are not a one size
fits all and the WHO UP
checklist has not yielded
effects anticipated
-A systematic review searched
for literature and concluded
there was ‘no literature to
substantiate the effectiveness
of the current Joint
Commission Universal
Protocol in decreasing the rate
of wrong site, wrong level
surgery

Level V- A,
High-Quality
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simulated
scenarios

may be more
pronounced in
particular
settings.
-UP none of
eight sites had
a ‘standard
plan for
intravenous
access for
cases of high
blood loss’, or
formal team
briefings
preoperatively
or
postoperativel
y.
-In January
2004, the
Joint
Commission
launched the
first version
of the UP for
Preventing
Wrong Site,
Wrong
Procedure,
Wrong Person
Surgery
-Wrong-site
surgery is
rare; estimates

- lack of
availability of
necessary
equipment
-unanticipated
blood loss
- non-sterile
equipment,
and surgical
items (eg,
sponges) left
inside patients
- The
complexity of
most surgical
procedures
requires a
wellcoordinated
team to
prevent these
events.
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for various
procedures
range from 1
in 13,000
procedures for
wrong-site
anesthesia
block to 1 in
4200 for
wrong side
ureteral stents
-- A general
systematic
review
estimated that
the overall
rate was 1–5
per 10,000
procedures.
12. VanKlei,
et al.
(2014)

Quantitative
retrospective
cohort study

-25,513
patients eval
in-hospital
mortality after
surgery over
30 days
-ECRI
Institute,
Plymouth
Meeting,
Pennsylvania,
USA

Implementing
WHO UP
Surgical
checklist
decreased inhospital
mortality
-Effects
depend
crucially on
actual
checklist
completion

-Crude
mortality
dropped from
3.13% to
2.85% (p=
0.19)

-The study conclusion was not Level V, Aclear if the improvement was High Quality
due to the utilization of the
checklist or simply increasing
awareness of patient safety
-The improvement outcome
was actually smaller than
previously reported

75

13. DeVries,
et al.
(2010)

Quantitative

-6 hospitals in
3 months
were a
baseline
period and 3
months after
were
evaluated
-Similar data
was observed
at 5 hospitals
as a control
population
-3760
patients’
records
evaluated
prior to safe
surgery
checklist
implementatio
n
-3820
patients’
records
evaluated
after safe
surgery
checklist
implementatio
n
-Used
multidisciplin
ary checklist

-Greater than
½ of all
surgical errors
occur outside
the OR
-The goal of
this study was
to target the
entire surgical
pathway
-After
implementatio
n of complete
checklist there
was an
association
with
decreased
surgical
complications
and mortality
in hospital
with high
standard of
care

-Total number
of
complications
with
perioperative
patients
decreased:
27.3% (with a
95% CI [25.928.7])
to 16.7%
(with a 95%
CI [15.617.9])
absolute risk
reduction of
10.6% (with a
95% CI [8.712.4])
-There was no
change at all
within the
control
hospitals

1.Because there were before
Level I, Aand after phases, there could
High Quality
have been influence
2. Including
prospective data could
possibly have underregistration data inconsistency
3. Documentation of
complications limited to
period of admission; any data
post-op could not be tracked
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14. Conley, et Qualitative
al. (2011).

-5 hospitals in
WA
-Conducted
semistructured
interviews
with
implementatio
n leaders and
surgeons from
September to
December
2009

-Despite
significant
decrease in
mortality and
other post-op
complications
UP and
SURPASS,
real-world
impact is
likely to vary
with
effectiveness
of each
hospital’s
implementatio
n of the
process
-If checklists
are built with
no
appreciation
for HOW it
works, this
ignores
critical
sociocultural
dimension
required for
safer care.
-Success
implementatio

-If checklists
are not
explained and
demonstrated
this can lead
to frustration,
disinterest,
and eventual
abandonment

1.Survey was Level V- C-Low Quality
conducted via
telephone
with a
sampling of
WA hospitals
which were
selected by
local hospital
association
2.
Organizations
are at varying
stages of
readiness
3. Budget
constraints
did not allow
site visitation
4. Results
may not be a
representative
or complete
sampling
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n is important
related to the
ability of
leaders to
explain why
AND show
how to use the
checklist
15. Paull, et
al. (2014)

Quantitative

-The Veterans
Health
Administratio
n (VHA)
database of
root cause
analyses was
queried for all
cases
involving an
incorrect
surgical
procedure
between 2004
and 2013 to
determine the
relative
frequency and
characteristics
of wrong
surgery events
because of
errors
upstream and
downstream

Understandin
g why some
of these
events are not
caught by the
steps of the
UP,
culminating in
the time-out,
can help the
field to add
upstream and
downstream
safeguards to
help prevent
these never
events

-Forty-eight
cases of
wrong surgery
events
because of
upstream/do
wnstream
errors were
analyzed,
representing
- 16% of the
308 root
cause
analyses for
wrong surgery
events
reported
during this
period
-Wrong
-Upstream
surgery events errors
can and do
included
occur despite mislabeling of
adherence to specimens,
while

-The results from the VHA
Level I- Amay not be generalizable to
High Quality
non-VHA patient populations
- We did not review medical
records because the cases are
deidentified, but rather RCA
reports, the latter often
missing clinical details
-Another limitation was in the
calculation of harm for wrong
patient surgery. A patient
undergoing a prostatectomy
inadvertently because of
mislabeling of a previous
prostate biopsy certainly was
harmed. But what about the
other patient who was
erroneously notified that they
had benign disease and the
delay in care incurred?
Notwithstanding these
limitations, the study yielded
sufficient information to begin
to characterize wrong
surgery events associated
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16. Eltorai.
(2018).

Qualitative

to the
Universal
Protocol
-This
subgroup of
wrong surgery
events was
selected from
among all the
wrong surgery
events by 2
clinicians
with expertise
in patient
safety (Kappa
5 .91)

UP including
a time-out
-The
prevention of
incorrect
procedures
requires
complementar
y safety
behaviors and
technologies
to address
errors that
occur
upstream
and
downstream
to the UP and
the time-out

downstream
errors were
associated
with
ineffective
intraoperative
process
-Surgical
procedures
that were
particularly
vulnerable
included
wrong level
spine
operations,
wrong patient
prostatectomi
es, wrong
implant
cataract
procedures,
and wrong
site skin
lesion
excisions

with errors upstream and
downstream to the UP that
may not have been otherwise
prevented by the UP, and
allow those to be compared
and contrasted with wrong
surgery events that would
have been prevented by the
UP

-Lessons
from the sky:
an aviationbased
framework
for maximizin
g the delivery

-2 professions
have
substantial
parallels
- manage a
crisis
situation,

-Accident
reporting and
investigations
-Simulationbased error
analysis

-Medicine and Aviation have
many parallels but many
differences within the
industries, some changes
could be adapted by medicine
from aviation

Level V,
Integrative
review
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of quality
anesthetic
care

where lives
are at stake, at
a moment’s
notice and
with
incomplete
information
- determinants
of quality
performance
in both
professions
extend far
beyond
knowledge
base and
formal
training
- The science
of human
factors, a
prominent
cornerstone of
the aviation
industry, has
not yet found
the same
place in
medicine
-could change
the
understanding
and execution
of medical
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decisionmaking in
profound
ways
-Specific
components
of crisis
management
and root cause
analysis in
aviation can
serve as
models for
improving
those same
aspects within
anesthesiolog
y
- Literature
published
within the
aviation and
human factors
industries
presents a
unique lens
through which
anesthesiologi
sts can view
their own
errors,
challenges,
and quests for
improved

81

performance
1. Systematic
error review
and reporting,
along with
2. Simulationbased studies
of error
mechanisms
and quality
improvement
interventions,
represent two
major
vehicles for
advancement
within
anesthesiolog
y that are
already
successfully
demonstrated
by the
aviation
industry
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Appendix B
Robust Process Improvement® Diagram

Joint Commission Center for Transforming Healthcare. (n.d.) Facilitating change.
https://www.centerfortransforminghealthcare.org/who-we-are/facilitating-change/
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Appendix C
P Value Calculation for Baseline SS TST® Pre-Op Booking Data

Source: Center for Transforming Healthcare Aggregate Baseline Values for Pre-Op Booking
Total Observations = 12, 915
Baseline Observations = 5,735
Improve Observations = 7,180
Baseline Observations 5,735 x .55 = 3,154 Defective Observations
Improve Observations = 7,180 x .24 = 1,723 Defective Observations
P-value = 0.000
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Appendix D
Stakeholder Analysis
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Appendix E
Baseline Data/ (redacted)
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Appendix F
Most Prevalent Defects (redacted)
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Appendix G
Gap Analysis
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Appendix H / Gantt Chart
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SS TST Projected Timeline
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Appendix I
Work Breakdown Structure
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Appendix J
Responsibility/ Communication Plan/ Charter
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Charter
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Appendix K
SWOT Analysis
SWOT Analysis/ Targeting Pre-Operative Booking Processes to Decrease Risk of “Never Events”

STRENGTHS (internal):
•
•
•
•
•

Supportive leadership
-CNO and Perioperative Director
Multiple entities recognize lack of pre-op booking standardization
Very Performance Improvement-Driven Organization
Three-time Magnet© Recognition Facility w/ EBP reigning throughout
While not an employee, have been shadowing, meeting staff for ~3mos
OPPORTUNITIES (external):

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Ability to consolidate proven improvement methods
Outside hospitals/healthcare organizations (HCOs) able to learn from
TST data
Ability to potentially publish aggregate findings to aid other HCOs’
progress to decrease WSS
Ability to utilize RPI, LSS, CRM, HRO principles
Create strategy to share best practices with external organizations
There is a definite need for more research regarding surgical
scheduling/booking
With COVID-19 there have been positive changes requiring a greater
number of steps pre-operatively to decrease ‘rapid add-ons’

WEAKNESSES (internal):
•
•
•
•

Project lead does not know CMO or Product Line Chief
Unknown actual timeline
Unsure if upon initial evaluation will actually find defects
Lack of contacts internally (not DNP project lead employer)

THREATS (external):
•
•
•
•
•

Not adequate research on surgical scheduling/booking and contributing
factors for WSS
Not one size fits all for checklists or HCOs/settings
Multiple entry points into surgical scheduling
Often physician offices have no direct affiliation with the location surgery
is performed
Physician offices deal with multiple HCOs
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Appendix L
Budget
Staff

Category

Project Lead
RN Consultant

Data Analyst
Consultant

Project Oversight
Consultant

Peri-op Director
CNO

Training Hours

Costs & Budget
Key Stakeholder
Group Hours
40 hours/week/
2weeks per month
(once a month
consultation x1
hour x4 months)
=$224
(data extraction)
(x10 months x 4
weeks/month (once
a week) x1 hour
each week
x10 months x
4wks/month (once
a week) x1 hour
each week
2x’s a month x1 hr
x10 months)
support/Stakeholde
r update meeting 2
x’s/month= x4

Cost/Yr1
(avg annual
inflation= 3.7%)
$44,800

Yr 2

Yr 3

$45,427

$46,062

$224

$227.13

$230.30

$2400

$2434

$2468

$4800

$4867

$4935

$2400

$2434

$2468

$4800

$4867

$4935
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hrs/month x 10
months
(2x’s a month x 10
months $178/hr )
(2 x’s a month) x 2
hrs

Anesthesia
Champion
Chief of Medical
Staff
Hospital Surgical
Schedulers
Physician Office
Surgical Schedulers
TOTALS
Costs for 3 years:
$202,411.20

x 8 hrs/month x 10
months
x 4 hrs/month x 10
months

$3650

$3701

$3753

$1471.80

$1491

$1512

$1325.60

$1344

$1363

$662.80

$672.07

$682

$66,534.20

$67,466

$68,411
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IT Cost Estimates

TOTAL Investment= $66,534.20 staffing costs + $67,520.00 IT Upgrade Costs =
$134,064.20
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Budget (cost avoidance)
• Cost avoidance should be handled differently as a cost benefit analysis or cost effectiveness analysis.
• Cost for loss of limb/life (avg $179K) National Practitioner Data Bank
• Decrease/eliminate Perioperative Director and Patient Care Director daily texts/emails to confirm Pre-Admit Orders and
for OR schedule day prior to surgery
• Standardize process to decrease deviation/increased risk (eliminate redundancy and cost associated with this)
• Decrease eliminate wasted OR time and opened/unused sets if wrong procedure or wrong approach set up (est. $16/min
OR time, exclusive of Anesthesia or Surgeon avg $320/wrong side-wrong approach surgical set-up delays and cost)

Budget (cost avoidance)
Mitigating Strategy
Cost for WSS avg (NPDB)
Decrease/Eliminate Periop
and Surg Services Directors
Texts/Emails daily
Standardize
Process/decrease surgical
schedulers’ on-phone hold
time & RN “wasted” time
Pre-Admit Clinic for
patients arriving without
orders
(See graph below)
Decrease/eliminate wasted
OR time and opened/unused
sets if wrong procedure or
wrong approach set up (avg

Cost Avoidance/Yr1
~$179,000
~$62,400/yr

Yr2
$181,506
$63,234

Yr3
$184,047
$64,119

~$44,989.56

$45,619.41

$46,258.08

est. $16/min OR time,
exclusive of Anesthesia or
Surgeon, avg $320/wrong
side-wrong approach

$325 x 288/yr

$370 x 288/yr

$93,600

$106,560
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20 min turnover time to set
up for new case)
TOTALS
Cost Avoidance due to harm
x3 years

surgical set-up delays and
cost ~288/year= $92,160
$378,549.56

$383,959.41

$400,984.08
$1,163,493.05

Assumptions:
1.

Per National Practitioner Data Base (NPDB) Mortality Rate for WSS 13.9% with a mean liability rate of $179K.

2.

# of events and patient days same in baseline periods (by definition, no events are prevented in baseline periods)

3.

Adverse Event Rate current baseline 75%

4.

Will see decreased # of events by ~50% each period Q1-Q4

5.

Annual Inflation Rate of 1.4%

6.

Salaries based off salary.com

121

Cost Avoidance / Data for Patients Arriving to Pre-Admit Clinic Without Orders
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Appendix M
Post Intervention Data (redacted)

Appendix N
Data Collection Instrument (redacted)
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Appendix O
Surgical Scheduler Pre and Post Intervention Data
Pre-Intervention Responses
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Post-Intervention Responses
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Appendix P
Surgical Scheduler Quality Improvement Questionnaire
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Appendix Q
Letters of Support from Agencies (redacted)
Data Use Agreement (redacted)
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Appendix R
Targeted Solution Intervention Tools (redacted)
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Appendix S
Surgical Scheduling/ Pre-Admit Clinic Process Map
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Appendix T
Slide Presentation to Physician Offices
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Appendix U
Pandemic Burden and Impact on Surgical Services Model

Søreide, K., Hallet, J., Matthews, J. B., Schnitzbauer, A. A., Line, P. D., Lai, P. B. S., Otero, J., Callegaro, D., Warner, S. G., Baxter,
N. N., Teh, C. S. C., Ng‐Kamstra, J., Meara, J. G., Hagander, L., & Lorenzon, L. (2020). Immediate and long‐term impact of the
COVID‐19 pandemic on delivery of surgical services. British Journal of Surgery, 107(10), 1250-1261. doi: 10.1002/bjs.11670
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Søreide, K., Hallet, J., Matthews, J. B., Schnitzbauer, A. A., Line, P. D., Lai, P. B. S., Otero, J., Callegaro, D., Warner, S. G., Baxter,
N. N., Teh, C. S. C., Ng‐Kamstra, J., Meara, J. G., Hagander, L., & Lorenzon, L. (2020). Immediate and long‐term impact of the
COVID‐19 pandemic on delivery of surgical services. British Journal of Surgery, 107(10), 1250-1261. doi: 10.1002/bjs.11670
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Appendix V
IRB Exemption (redacted)

149

Appendix W
Statement of Non-Research Determination (redacted)

